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Abstract: This paper discusses software patents’ unique attributes, challenges in 
trying to address problems with software patents, and some ideas for fixing the 
problems with software patents.  It was written in connection with a November 
2012 conference at Santa Clara University School of Law entitled “Solutions to 
the Software Patent Problem,” and the initial version of this paper was published 
in three posts at the Tertium Quid blog at Forbes. 
 
The U.S. patent system generally treats all innovations equally, but the innovation process varies 
widely across different industries.  In particular, the software industry differs from other major 
innovative industries—such as computer hardware and biotech/pharmaceuticals—in several key 
ways, and those differences can create (and indeed have created) significant friction for the 
patent system. 
 
Software patents have created big and expensive problems for companies throughout all sectors 
of our economy.  Pretty much as soon as they get venture financing, start-up companies are 
approached by “patent trolls” with offers that can’t be refused: pay off the troll now or pay a 
lawyer many times that amount later fighting in court.  And large companies, especially in the 
smartphone industry, are paying literally billions of dollars to acquire patent portfolios to keep 
those portfolios from falling into the wrong hands; and with the hope that large patent portfolios 
will fend off competitor threats (i.e., provide the company freedom to operate its business 
without interference from competitors’ patents). 
 
I wrote this essay in connection with the “Solutions to the Software Patent Problem” conference 
held at Santa Clara University (SCU) School of Law on November 16, 2012.
1
  The conference 
was structured unusually for an academic conference.  Rather than debate the merits of software 
patents, the conference started with the premise that software patents need to be fixed.  This 
allowed us to spend all of our time exploring potential fixes, some of which are recapped in part 
three.  To extend the discussion to a wider audience, many speakers also published short essays 
(designed to be accessible to lay readers) in Wired.com’s Opinion feature.2 
 
This essay proceeds in three parts.  The first part explains how innovation in the software 
industry differs from other industries, and the implications of those differences for software 
patents.  The second part explores two structural hurdles to addressing the unique problems that 
software innovations pose to the patent system: (a) the challenge of defining “software,” and (b) 
which regulatory institution(s) can implement any fixes.  The third part discusses some of my 
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2. 
favorite ideas proposed at the conference and how our community can make progress towards 
fixing software patents. 
 
I. Why Are Software Patents Different? 
 
What’s unique about software?  Some of the main differences that distinguish software from 
other innovations: 
 
A. Software Has Short Innovation Cycles. 
 
Software iterates quickly.  Most software programs and their associated features have an 
effective commercial life of only a few years, at which point new software developments 
invariably render prior software innovations obsolete.  Contrast this with mechanical 
innovations, which may have commercial lives of decades, and pharmaceutical innovations, 
which may retain commercial value indefinitely.   
 
Two implications of the short innovation cycles in the software industry: 
 
Software Has Significant First Mover Advantages.  Software innovators can recoup some of their 
R&D investments from the de facto marketplace exclusivity associated with being the first 
mover.  An example: assume that a particular software innovation has a two-year commercial 
lifecycle and it takes competitors 6 months to bring a matching product to market.  In a situation 
like this, the first mover gets 1/4 of the maximum useful exclusivity period simply by being first 
to market.  In some situations, the exclusivity period provided by the first mover advantage is 
more than enough to motivate software R&D without any patent protection. 
 
Software Lifecycles End Before Patents Issue.  As a practical matter, the commercial lifespan of 
many software programs and features is usually shorter than the time it takes the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office (PTO) to resolve a patent application—a process that can take four years or 
more.  Invariably, the patented innovation will be obsolete by the time the Patent Office decides 
whether it’s patent-worthy. 
 
B. Software Will Be Developed Without Any Patent Incentive. 
 
We principally justify patent law on utilitarian grounds: social welfare improves by providing 
innovators with an economic reward in the form of a limited-term marketplace exclusivity.  The 
utilitarian argument leads to the hallmark “quid-pro-quo” of patents: society gives innovators 
valuable monopoly-like rights to exclude competition in exchange for a number of socially 
valuable deliverables like investments in R&D, public disclosure of those R&D results, and, 
eventually, the unrestricted rights to replicate the innovation. 
 
When the quid-pro-quo model works as designed, it’s great; but that’s not always the case.  One 
way the quid-pro-quo model can break down is when we give up the quid (i.e., the rights to 
exclude) when we would have gotten the quo (i.e., the R&D investments and public disclosure) 
in any case.  In those circumstances, society “overpays” for the innovation. 
 
3. 
Some reasons why we might be overpaying in the case of software patents: 
 
Copyrights and Trade Secrets Provide Adequate Production Incentives.  Multiple aspects of 
software can qualify for copyright protection, including source code, compiled code, visual 
layout, documentation, and potentially the aggregation of menu commands (the “structure, 
sequence and organization” of the software).  The ideas embodied in those software attributes 
aren’t copyrightable (they are protectable, if at all, under patent law), but the fuzzy borde3r 
between uncopyrightable ideas and copyrightable expression gives additional breadth to 
software’s copyright protection.3   
 
In addition to copyrights, trade secrets can protect software source code and potentially other 
aspects of software.  While trade secret law doesn’t prevent copying of widely available 
software, it can still slow the competition (and thereby extend any first mover advantage) by 
keeping certain aspects from helping competitors build their knockoffs. 
 
Thus, even if it’s not complete protection, the combination of copyright and trade secrets can 
provide substantial competitive protection for software.  Historically, this combination has 
provided adequate incentives to the software industry.  Indeed, during the first several decades of 
the software industry—a period which saw explosive industry growth—software patents were 
rarely obtained and even more rarely enforced. 
 
Software Vendors Can Restrict Competition Without Patents.  Software can have substantial 
lock-in effects that can hinder competition without patents.  Software users may become locked 
into one vendor’s offerings due to, for example, proprietary file formats, the difficulty of 
learning/re-learning menu commands or keystrokes, a developer community that creates valuable 
software-specific apps, and user investments in vendors’ own proprietary customizations (such 
as the infamous example of user-authored macros in Lotus 1-2-3).  We might lament the 
restrictions on competition caused by these lock-in effects, but so long as the software vendor 
doesn’t break the law, they represent a crucial explanation for software innovation without patent 
incentives. 
 
Software Gets Produced Without Any IP Incentives at All.  The free and open source software 
community provides another example of software’s quo without patent’s quid.  In those 
communities, contributors typically waive or voluntarily restrict any intellectual property 
protection for their contributions.  Often, contributors monetize their efforts through non-IP 
mechanisms, such as offering maintenance or customization services for the software or building 
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a reputation for programming expertise that leads to job offers.
4
  Further, some free and open 
source software contributions are made purely altruistically, without any financial expectations at 
all.  Collectively, the free and open source software community has proven that lots of 
software—even large-scale enterprise-class software—will be produced without any patent 
incentives at all. 
 
C. Some Software Patent-Specific Problems 
 
Software Gets Patented at Too High a Level of Abstraction.  Stripped to its basics, software 
gathers, manipulates or displays data.  There may be novel ways of accomplishing these goals, 
but the true novelty typically lies in how the software code is written, not the functional concepts 
of gathering, manipulating or displaying data that the code implements.  Unfortunately, too many 
software patents claim protection at the highest level of abstraction (e.g., “moving data on a 
network”), not at the more appropriate lower level like the more mundane implementation of that 
concept. 
 
Software patent “over abstraction” leads to software patents that overclaim their true novelty. 
The over-claiming should lead to patent application denials on numerous grounds, including lack 
of enablement, failure to satisfy the written description requirement, and obviousness.  But if the 
PTO doesn’t aggressively screen software patents on those grounds, bogus patents get through 
the system.  That’s happened way too often. 
 
The PTO Mishandled Software Patent Applications.  Furthermore, for a long time—a decade or 
more—the PTO did not adequately research the prior art applicable to software patents.  Patent 
examiners typically focus prior art searches on the database of existing patents.  This means that 
when there’s a watershed technological change—like the wave of software patent applications 
from the 1990s and early 2000s—the examiners don’t see a lot of applicable prior art in their 
existing patent database.  Therefore, the examiners grant patents that don’t deserve protection.  
Eventually the patent database becomes rich enough with prior art to reach an equilibrium, but 
the errors in the interim produce a cohort of legacy patents that should never have issued. 
 
Software Is Too Hard to Describe Precisely.  Related to the abstraction problem, the boundaries 
of many software “innovations” are too hard to describe precisely.  (In contrast, the specific 
implementation methods would be much easier to describe).  Because of the semantic 
challenges, the resulting patents are so opaque that no one can understand what they mean.  This 
also means that patent owners can adopt expansive interpretations of the patent boundaries and 
use the threat of patent litigation over these ambiguous and expansive borders to extract cash 
from potential defendants—even defendants who would ultimately prevail in court. 
 
Patent Research by Subsequent Innovators Is Too Costly.  In theory, product developers can 
check the patent database to see if they are transgressing someone else’s patents.  In practice, this 
doesn’t work in the software industry for at least two reasons.  First, as mentioned, the 
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ambiguous wording of software patents means that subsequent developers may not interpret a 
patent to cover development efforts.  Second, large software programs may have millions of lines 
of code, while patents may protect functionality that is expressed in only a few lines of code.  As 
a result, a single software program could potentially implicate thousands, or even tens of 
thousands, of patents.  The prohibitive costs to find these patents, research their applicability, and 
then, where appropriate, negotiate licenses to even a small fraction of those patents, would vastly 
exceed the potential economic returns from most software applications.  Thus, software 
developers rationally choose not to research the patent database at all and instead “fly blind.” 
 
II. Challenges to Fixing Software Patents 
 
The prior section described how software interacts with the patent system potentially differently 
than the way other innovative activities do.  This section explores two structural challenges that 
will confront any effort to fix software patents: (A) defining the term “software,” and (B) 
determining who can fix software patents. 
 
A. Can “Software” Be Defined? 
 
We may know software when we see it, but can we define “software” precisely enough to 
subject it to different treatment under patent law? 
 
Consider the definition of “software patent” in a recently proposed bill, the SHIELD Act:5 
 
a patent that covers— 
‘(A) any process that could be implemented in a computer regardless of whether a 
computer is specifically mentioned in the patent; or 
‘(B) any computer system that is programmed to perform a process described in 
subparagraph (A).’ 
 
This definition isn’t satisfying.  First, the term “computer” doesn’t have a natural boundary.  
Though elsewhere the statute defines “computer,” the reality is that the definition may cover 
almost any electronic device—especially given that many devices increasingly have computer-
like functionality and are networked.  Second, I don’t know what “process” means in this 
context, and the broad language “could be implemented” is uncomfortably capacious.  Just about 
anything can be implemented via software. 
 
In theory, we can distinguish software from physical devices (e.g., “hardware”).  But even if we 
do, innovators can often replicate software functionality by designing hardware to incorporate 
the functionality directly.  In this sense, hardware and software are partial substitutes for each 
other.  In fact, before patent law clearly allowed software patents, innovators (especially IBM) 
routinely obtained “software” patents by patenting hardware designed to perform the software-
like function.  So any special rules for software patents will just push innovators and their patent 
lawyers to seek patent protection for hardware that achieves the same outcome, obtaining the 
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synthetic equivalent of a software patent.  If that happens, we aren’t making much progress on 
software patents. 
 
Crafting special rules for software patents raises another concern.  The U.S. has entered into 
international treaties that generally require us to treat all patentable innovations consistently, 
rather than providing heterogeneous protection for different innovative activity.  Thus, trying to 
fix software patents might violate our international treaty obligations.  Fortunately, Prof. Colleen 
Chien (SCU) has shown how we could implement software-specific fixes consistent with our 
treaty obligations.
6
  Indeed, we’ve already created different rules for different innovations, such 
as special rules for business methods, surgical methods, tax strategies and others. 
 
So, fixing software patents is tricky.  It may not be possible to define software patents precisely, 
it may be easy for patent applicants to game any software-specific rules, and we have to find a 
way to remain in compliance with our treaty obligations.  On the other hand, if we avoid 
software patent-specific fixes and instead try to make changes across all patents, that 
would dramatically increase the number of potential opponents to the change—and reduce the 
odds of success. 
 
B. Who Can Fix the Problems? 
 
Whether we decide to change software patents specifically or all patents categorically, the other 
major threshold issue is figuring out who can implement a fix.  The main options are Congress, 
the courts, the PTO and the industry itself through market solutions and industry self-regulation. 
 
Congress.  In general, the most elegant solutions to software patents involve changes to the 
patent statute, although most advocates are reluctant to explore this route.  After all, it took years 
to get the America Invents Act (AIA) through Congress, and the result was significantly watered 
down from its starting point (and unusually buggy).
7
  Congress probably doesn’t have a lot of 
enthusiasm right now to tackle big structural revisions to patent law, and there’s always the 
possibility of further legislative paralysis based on pushback from the pharmaceutical industry, 
trolls or the few software industry players who are OK with software patents. 
 
As an intermediate compromise, at the SCU conference Prof. Christal Sheppard (Nebraska) 
suggested that Congress could pass more resolutions stating Congress’ intent.  Although the 
resolutions aren’t binding law, they nevertheless could provide helpful guidance to the courts 
more quickly and without the typical bruising fights. 
 
The Courts.  Law professors often prefer using the judicial system to effectuate legal change.  
Common law courts have the inherent power to evolve the law, and judicial evolution sidesteps 
the messy legislative sausage-making process.  But courts generally can only color within the 
lines laid for them by Congress (subject to possible Constitutional limits on legislative power), 
so courts can’t solve all of the problems themselves.  Judges also attempt to resolve the disputes 
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on their docket, not broader social issues, and they often don’t (and shouldn’t) seek out 
information not provided by the litigants fighting those disputes.  Thus, it’s not especially easy to 
educate judges and get them to reflect broader social concerns in their rulings. 
 
PTO.  As the government agency that manufactures patents, the PTO has a lot of power to 
control its manufacturing process.  However, the PTO generally leans pro-patents and therefore 
may lack enthusiasm to fix any problems that result in over-patenting.  The PTO also must abide 
by the rules established by Congress and the courts. 
 
Industry Self-Regulation.  For many software industry participants, software patents create a type 
of prisoner’s dilemma.8  If the industry could find a way to avoid software patents, the 
overall industry would be better off.  However, so long as any company can obtain patents, it’s in 
that company’s best interest to do so (whether for offensive or defensive purposes).  The result is 
that each company in the industry acquires patents solely to maximize its individual welfare, but 
the entire industry is worse off.  A successful market-based approach would change companies’ 
payoffs so they no longer face the prisoner’s dilemma.  This is easier said than done. 
 
In all likelihood, we may need participation from each institution to fully redress the problems 
with software patents.   
 
III. Ways to Fix Software Patents. 
 
Unfortunately, the rhetoric about software patents tends to devolve into a black-or-white debate: 
Are software patents good for society, or should we kill them? 
 
We need to move past that binary—and irresolute—discussion.  At the SCU conference, we 
simply assumed that software patents were a problem.  With that premise, conference 
participants could focus their attention on thoughtful and creative ways to redress the problems 
created by software patents.  Undoubtedly, some of the speakers and attendees favored killing 
software patents outright.  However, most of the speakers proponed more nuanced and 
implementable approaches to remediate the problems of software patents, without resolving the 
question of whether software patents are good or bad. 
 
At the SCU conference, we heard a lot of different proposals (nearly two dozen) from experts in 
the field.  All of them had promise (that’s why we put the presentations on the agenda in the first 
place), but here’s a recap of some of my personal favorites: 
 
Prof. Mark Lemley (Stanford).  Prof. Lemley argued that many software patents use 
“functional claiming,” which is patenting a software function (the problem that the patent seeks 
solve) rather than a specific way to implement that functionality (the innovator’s solution to the 
problem).  For example, currently we allow patent claims in the form, “a computer programmed 
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to achieve this result” or “a computer programmable/capable of achieve a result” (his research 
identified 11,000 patents using the “capable of” language).  Prof. Lemley argued that we should 
prevent functional claiming in software, allowing patents only on methods of achieving the 
function, not the function itself.
 9
   
 
Prof. Lemley’s proposal squarely attacks the breadth of software patents.  By limiting software 
patents to their specific way of accomplishing a function, other innovators can develop 
alternative solutions without infringing the patent.  Further, courts and the PTO can execute this 
solution without legislative changes by changing the way they apply existing laws.  Thus, this 
solution could be implemented immediately and cheaply. 
 
Prof. Arti Rai (Duke).  Prof. Rai noted parallels between software patents and patents on 
bioinformatics—basically, software applied to biopharmaceuticals—which are handled in PTO 
Art Unit 1631.
10
  In art unit 1631, the PTO implemented a more stringent non-
obviousness review of applications, requiring patent applicants to provide more thorough written 
patent descriptions and more definite patent claims.  Due to the heightened scrutiny of 
bioinformatics patents, a noticeably higher percentage of applications were rejected on non-
obviousness grounds.  Prof. Rai argued that software could be subjected to similarly heightened 
scrutiny, something that (like Prof. Lemley’s solution) the PTO and courts could implement 
immediately under existing law.  On the other hand, changing the PTO’s evaluation of software 
patents doesn’t address the perniciousness of legacy software patents that never should have 
issued. 
  
Prof. John Duffy (Virginia).  Prof. Duffy took a more conceptual approach than Profs. Lemley 
and Rai.  He argued that patent law’s non-obviousness requirement should screen out 
innovations that multiple inventors identify around the same time.
11
  While perhaps counter-
intuitive, simultaneous invention happens often.
12
  If multiple inventors achieve the same 
solution around the same time, then the innovation apparently was obvious to the relevant 
experts and therefore doesn’t deserve the patent reward.   
 
Though the approach isn’t limited to software patents, it would help with software patents—
which are also the subject of simultaneous invention—and it could be implemented by the PTO 
and judges without new legislation.  However, I’m concerned about the adjudication costs to 
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figure out if multiple inventors made the same innovation around the same time.  Furthermore, I 
would expect patent applicants in some non-software disciplines—notably, pharmaceuticals—
may resist this approach, potentially even seeking Congressional intervention. 
 
Prof. Sam Vermont (University of Miami).  Prof. Vermont noted that in some cases, the 
research costs to find and review precedent patents are more expensive than independent 
invention.  This is especially true with software innovations.
13
  Thus, Prof. Vermont proposed a 
defense to infringement in cases where “defendant’s costs to find the patentee’s version of the 
invention beforehand were greater than the defendant’s costs to invent it on his own.”14  In some 
sense, this situation is a damning indictment of those patents; if it’s cheaper to recreate the 
innovations than to find their patents, why did we give the patent reward to those innovations in 
the first place?  For that reason, I like Prof. Vermont’s suggestion.  However, it would require 
new legislation to implement, making it potentially more of an insightful thought exercise than a 
practical near-term solution. 
 
Profs. James Bessen (Boston University) and Brian Love (SCU).  Professors Bessen and Love 
separately advocated for maintenance fee reform as a solution to software patents.  Prof. Bessen 
analogized patents to pollution because both produce negative externalities.  To internalize the 
externality, Prof. Bessen argued for Pigouvian taxes
15
 in the form of increased maintenance fees 
(i.e., ongoing payments to maintain the patent in effect).  By his estimate, the maintenance fee 
rates should increase tenfold to reflect the patents’ true social costs.  He would further adjust 
maintenance fees to reflect the likelihood of patents being asserted, which would lead to even 
greater increases for software and business method patents.
16
   
 
In a separate project, Prof. Brian Love has identified that some of the lowest-merit patent 
lawsuits are brought near the end of a patent’s term.  We might avoid some of those suits by 
statutorily truncating the patent term, but Congress isn’t likely to approve that.  Instead, we can 
achieve a similar result by changing the maintenance fee structure to financially encourage some 
weak patents to lapse early, increasing maintenance fees as the patent ages, and adding new late-
term maintenance fee payment periods.
17
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Economic theory supports modifying maintenance fees by getting patent owners to internalize 
the costs of their actions.  In particular, I was particularly persuaded by Prof. Love’s analysis that 
we should have at least one more maintenance fee payment period later in the patent term; the 
last maintenance fee payment date comes too early in the patent term. 
 
However, tinkering with maintenance fees could produce unexpected results.  A Vanderbilt Law 
Review paper
18
 suggests the PTO may adjust its patent issuance rate to maximize its revenue.  
Reducing the PTO’s maintenance fee revenue by lapsing more patents might cause the PTO to 
issue more patents to increase revenues from patents before they lapse.  Similarly, increasing 
patent maintenance fees could cut in different directions.  The PTO might reject weak patents 
because it’s receiving increased revenues from issued patents, or the PTO might issue more weak 
patents in a pure revenue grab.  It might be possible to ameliorate these unwanted budget-driven 
decisions, but before we tinker with maintenance fees, we need to understand all of the economic 
effects, not just how patent owners will respond. 
 
Prof. Jennifer Urban (UC Berkeley).  Prof. Urban, along with Prof. Jason Schultz (UC 
Berkeley), proposed the Defensive Patent License (DPL).
19
  Patent owners that opt-into the DPL 
agree to license their patents royalty-free to everyone else who has opted into the DPL.  In effect, 
everyone participating in the DPL agrees not to sue each other for patent infringement.  This 
gives companies substantial incentive to opt-in to the DPL; by doing so, they eliminate the 
potential patent risk from dozens, hundreds or even thousands of other industry participants.  
From a theoretical perspective, this solution nicely responds to the industry’s prisoner’s dilemma 
by providing incentives to voluntarily defang patents. 
 
However, the DPL has some obvious limitations, including: (1) it does not affect patent trolls 
who would likely never participate in the DPL, (2) it assumes enough players join the DPL to 
make it attractive for other companies to want to participate (i.e., the DPL exhibits network 
effects), and (3) it assumes that DPL participants bring enforcement actions against non-DPL 
participants; otherwise, non-participants can free-ride off the DPL network without paying the 
costs.  I think the DPL is a brilliant concept, but it remains to be seen how effective it will be in 
the marketplace.   
  
At the SCU conference, Ben Lee of Twitter introduced a related idea, the Innovator’s Patent 
Agreement (IPA),
20
 where Twitter unilaterally promises that it will not assert specific patents 
offensively.  This promise principally is aimed at Twitter’s own employees, who don’t have to 
fear that their innovative work will lead to socially harmful patent lawsuits.  The IPA doesn’t 
rely on network effects, so any company can adopt it unilaterally.  For that reason, however, IPA 
adoptions may be slow and possibly de minimis. 
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11. 
Other Ideas.  Two other solutions to software patents that came up throughout the SCU 
conference include the SHIELD Act and an independent invention defense. 
 
The SHIELD Act.  The SHIELD Act
21
 would make it easier for successful defendants to recoup 
attorneys’ fees in weak computer patent cases (both hardware and software).  The fee-shift only 
benefits defendants; successful plaintiffs wouldn’t be any more likely to get their attorneys’ fees 
covered.  As a result, the SHIELD Act would increase plaintiffs’ anticipated costs of litigation 
and thus discourage weak computer patent suits. 
 
None of the speakers at the SCU conference expressly advocated for the SHIELD Act, although 
Google’s Kent Walker (and others) did express support.22  Like all legislative solutions, the odds 
that the SHIELD Act will pass in the near future are low. 
 
An Independent Invention Defense.  Independent invention, i.e., innovators developing the same 
innovation without reference to each other’s work, occurs all the time, especially in the software 
community.  Unlike the other main intellectual properties,
23
 patent law does not have a general 
purpose independent invention defense.  Why do we treat patents differently? 
 
An independent invention defense to patent infringement poses several practical problems.  First, 
it will be asserted by most, if not all, defendants, thereby increasing patent adjudication costs. 
Second, the evidence to prove or disprove independent invention often will be self-serving and 
not credible.  If we ask engineers to self-report what material they reviewed to achieve their 
goals, invariably they won’t admit looking at the plaintiffs’ material.  Third, the defense will give 
inventors even more incentive not to research the patent database for fear of seeing patents and 
thus losing the ability to claim independent invention.  That would further undermine the public 
disclosure benefits of patents. 
 
These problems highlight the strength of Prof. Duffy’s suggestion.  Rather than trying to 
investigate what was independently invented and what wasn’t, we could use the fact that 
multiple inventors reached the same solution to support a non-obviousness objection—and, 
unlike an independent invention defense, we could achieve that result without any legislative 
changes. 
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Our November SCU conference attracted over 250 attendees—most of whom want to fix the 
problems with software patents.  It was a remarkably large and enthusiastic crowd, and there was 
palpable energy to fix software patents.  It’s clear that the Silicon Valley community, and many 
other technology communities, is experiencing a lot of pain from software patents. 
 
Even so, I remain bearish on legislative solutions—even relatively minor changes like the 
SHIELD Act—at least in the next few years.  Congress made some big moves with the AIA, and 
just cleaning up the AIA’s remaining bugs will consume whatever remaining time and appetite 
Congress has for patent reform. 
 
As a result, I’m more optimistic about solutions that the PTO or judges can unilaterally and 
immediately implement without any statutory changes.  I think a combination of Profs. 
Lemley’s, Rai’s and Duffy’s proposals are especially promising.  By re-characterizing the 
appropriate level of acceptable abstractness, requiring more proof from patent applicants, and 
then screening out innovations that multiple inventors achieve around the same time, the PTO 
would kill most of the least appropriate patents.  Judges could then finish off any unmeritorious 
patents that somehow get through the PTO.  I also think marketplace solutions, like the DPL and 
IPA, hold promise, but aren’t likely to solve the problems on their own. 
 
Ultimately, the single most important thing we can do is to keep identifying, publicizing and 
discussing problems with software patents, such as Prof. Chien’s research on startups and patent 
trolls
24
 and reforming software patents.
25
  By continuing to shine the spotlight on the issues,  
policymakers and judges won’t be able to ignore them—as evidenced by a recent speech by PTO 
Director Kappos shortly after the SCU conference,
26
 where he simultaneously (and quite 
defensively) decried critics of software patents and outlined the many steps the PTO has taken to 
improve handling of software patents.  Perhaps it’s so obvious that it need not be said at all, but 
the many criticisms levied against the PTO’s handling of software patents have helped drive 
some of the PTO’s improvements.  Simply discussing software patent issues publicly makes a 
difference.  
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